It ain’t what you do…

Sad times in the Justice shed. The light, freshness and candour anticipated by Tim Smart’s appointment by NHS Improvement has been akin to the unleashing of a new Grange Hill bullyboy in the Sloven hood. Threats of legal action against governors and ropey engagement with patients and families at the board meeting so far. Sigh.

The latest failing (inviting bereaved families to take part in a flim flam study without ethical consideration or thought) is another example of a leadership who know nothing about leadership. I had a long convo about the ‘study’ with Flash Gordon, Chief Operating Officer, Director of Performance, Quality and Safety and short straw drawer when it comes to talking to irate people late on a Friday afternoon before a bank holiday weekend.  He was as slippery as a slippery thing insisting it wasn’t “research” just talking to a few families. Brain melt. He eventually agreed to put it through their ethics process.

We, like so many others, remain baffled that the CEO and a chunk of the Sloven board haven’t resigned or been removed given everything that’s unfolded. There couldn’t be a clearer evidence trail of repeated failures over years. Of harrowing disrespect, contempt and disregard for human life.

And still nothing…

A short film recirculated on twitter yesterday. Around what ‘makes a top CEO’. Starring Mike Richards, Chief Inspector of Hospitals, CQC, the then CEO of Monitor, David Bennett and, er, Katrina Percy. Yes. Really. This was published online in December 2015, shortly before publication of the Mazars review. Truly extraordinary. But points to the secure position the Sloven CEO holds. The CQC and I’m sure Monitor were very aware of the content of the Mazars review by late summer 2015. You would think, given the scandalous content of that report, the Sloven CEO would not have been selected to talk about the qualities of a ‘top CEO’.

Nah.

Back in February 2016 a report was published by The independent Commission on Acute Adult Psychiatric Care, led by Lord Nigel Crisp. This report included recognition of Sloven’s mental health work. Eh??  Recognition of good work?  Sloven were, of course, quick to put this on their news pages:

Southern Health’s development of “care navigators” and involvement of patients with mental health needs and carers in decisions about their care have been highlighted by Lord Nigel Crisp, former Chief Executive of the NHS.

Given the latest (May 16) in a relentless series of critical inquest determinations  around failings in mental health provision, it seems that Crisp was listening to the Sloven talk rather than seeing evidence of the walk. Always a mistake with this bunch. The patient who spoke powerfully at the rebel governor meeting a week or so ago was not receiving anything remotely approaching good care and clearly hadn’t seen whiff of a ‘care navigator’. And the recent CQC inspection clearly identifies sustained failings in care.

Again, odd that Sloven was highlighted in the report. Surely Crisp had heard of the Mazars review and knew there were serious question marks around the care provided to mental health patients?

Nah.

Turns out he works with Katrina Percy’s dad though.

A very British killing…

51cKuFMMt-L._SX324_BO1,204,203,200_

Just started reading A very British Killing by Andrew Williams. About Baha Mousa, a hotel receptionist, killed by British troops during the Iraq War. A deeply horrific read for so many reasons. In the preface, Williams writes:

wilsonThe underlined sections could have been written about our experiences/the experiences of other families. Substituting civilian and military commanders with NHS Foundation Trusts, NHS England, NHS Improvement and the Department of Health. Light on apologetic, heavy on disdain. With the Mazars review demonstrating a more systemic and possibly less chaotic approach to the initial violence/harm people experience (not read the book yet so just guessing… sigh).

For three years now, the failing actions of the Sloven exec have been made visible. And they still don’t have to get it. Cosseted in a ‘safe space’ woven with overlapping strands of the Health and Social Care Act (2012)the erosion of accountability and the administrative grotesque, the bureaucratic apathy and institutional failure Wilson discusses, and more.

An example of the impermeability of this space. The Sloven circulation of the briefing about this blog, a day after LB’s death [howl] and the sharing of this unspeakably vile document on these pages, wider social media and during LB’s inquest and wider social media. This exposure, this uncovering and publication of truly toxic action by an NHS Trust would surely lead to censure, to serious reflection and action at board level (and higher) about the priorities/actions of the Trust..?

Nah. Not a dicky bird. Instead, almost three years later – three years littered with failed CQC reports, deaths, critical inquest determinations and no real action – the board papers for the meeting next week state:

risksThe Non-Executive Directors challenged whether the ability to respond to external reports and reputational issues should be the the Trust’s highest risk.’

Reputational risk remains top of the (inspirational) leadership board.

Having felt particularly ground down over the last few weeks/months. I’ll dredge up some optimism droplets and end with three reflections;

At least some of the slumbering non executive directors are (at last) waking up…

board

There will always be memories of the rebel governors and day trip to the Lyndhurst Community (involving a ‘well travelled jar of pickled onions’ with the My Life My Choice crew.)  

And Andrew Williams – who made these links between Baha Mousa, LB and others – is currently making his way through the bundles from LB’s inquest.

The confidential confidentiality agreement

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Back in October 2013, Fran was going to be the family advocate on the Sloven investigation into LB’s death. This descended into farce almost immediately as Fran was banned from being involved because of some trumped up nonsense around Oxfordshire Family Support Network. And then unbanned. Once back, Fran’s involvement only spread to one meeting before Verita were commissioned to do an external investigation.

At the meeting with two Sloven employees (one of whom wrote the leaked quality and safety review nearly a year before LB died; the report which Verita, NHS England and NHS Improvement are now arguing was disclosed (my arse)), Fran was given a lifelong confidentiality agreement to sign. She took a hard copy away to get it looked over, slightly bemused as it had bits crossed out and handwritten amendments.

She was surprised to receive several missed calls from the clinical director the next day (on her home phone and mobile) desperate to get hold of her and two messages. This is the first message (early evening). It was followed by a second message first thing the next morning asking her to get in touch. And more missed calls across the morning.

The life long confidentiality agreement itself was now confidential and not to be shared with anyone (not even a legal representative). Complete and utter Sloven nonsense. Typical bullying and bombastic approach. Terrible, terrible interaction with a family friend/member of the public. No whiff of care, concern or sensitivity around the fact that a young man drowned in their care. Just a dehumanising ‘mum and her solicitor’ and agitation.

What a sign of what lay ahead.

ps. Fran’s son, James, still uses Sloven services. Her willingness to publicly share this message and story is a testament to her not being cowed by bullying services who too often hold families over a barrel of fear. She said to me an age ago that she had been a whistleblower as a nurse in her early twenties. ‘Before ‘whistleblowers’ existed.’ She just called out poor practice. I think she’s right. This is the only way change will happen.

Stevens and the RiO fantastic

Oh dear. Reading the 24 page statement Lesley Stevens, Sloven Consultant Psychiatrist and Medical Director, provided  at LB’s inquest in October 2015 in the light of the leaked document.

It’s the stuff of many posts but to kick off briefly here…

Stevens says:

The report from Verita concluded that Connor’s death was preventable because he should have been subject to “line of sight/sound” observations whilst bathing and would have been had appropriate risk assessments and care plans been in place.

and

Following the CQC inspection in September 2013, the Trust stopped admitting any further patients to the STATT unit, to enable it to address the failings identified in the CQC’s report.

The same failings identified in the August 2012 review that remained buried until a week or so ago. Steven’s report (drawing on the much used Sloven technique of obliteration through jargon and word length) contains 12 pages about Sloven’s epilepsy map and toolkit. 12 pages. Completely unaware, over two years after LB’s death and all the changes allegedly implemented, that RiO doesn’t allow any recording of epilepsy information, she states:

The health professional undertaking the core assessment must assess the risk using the RIO (a software package) risk assessment form. NICE (2012) guidelines state that the following risks should be assessed as a minimum:

  • Bathing and showering
  • Preparing food, etc, etc

A failing so serious, the coroner flagged this up in his Prevention of Future Death report:

epilepsy shite

So blinking awkward. You’d think any organisation would be rigorous both in the changes made after the preventable death of a patient (typed this laborious phrase so many times now, I’m inclined use ‘killing’ as shorthand) and to check, double check, test and review everything that goes into a report to a coroner. Not the Slovens though. Nah. They just make it up.

Just noise. Public noise. White noise.  HSJ award winning noise. And it apparently doesn’t matter.

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Sloven and the ligature risks

A few weeks ago, we found out someone sent an anonymous letter to the Sloven CEO in 2011 flagging up health and safety concerns. Katrina Percy was, of course, totally oblivious. An independent Health and Safety consultant, Mike Holder, was appointed to troubleshoot. Two months later, he handed in his notice. Sloven were not prepared to listen or act.

Holder has shared the relevant documents and his leaving report with the Care Quality Commission (CQC), the Health and Safety Executive and Hampshire MPs, Suella Fernandes and Kit Malthouse. I caught up with some of this paperwork this evening. A couple of things leap out (outside of Holder’s meticulous detailing of the myriad ways Sloven were breaking Health and Safety legislation). These relate to ligature risks.

Holder shared this diagram showing the increase in ligature incidents over four years with the Interim Director of Nursing and AHP (dunno what AHP stands for) in Feb 2012.

lig incidents

Her reply is enough to make hair follicles seal up:

Nurse reply

Holder’s reply. Challenging the nonsensical with sense and clarity:  

Holder reply

Rich and I chatted about this earlier. He was reminded of this quote from Clifford Geertz, a classic anthropologist

I have never been impressed by the argument that as complete objectivity is impossible… one might as well let one’s sentiments run loose. As Robert Solow has remarked, that is like saying as a perfectly aseptic environment is impossible, one might as well conduct surgery in a sewer. 

Sloven clearly and consistently embrace the sewer approach with an abandon and a carelessness that is sickening. [There was another report today about the death of another patient/Sloven failings. Lesley Stevens, who seems to have a full time job attending inquests, was again bleating about ‘changes’.]

Changes my arse.

Dipping back to Feb 2012, the second, related point, is around action plans and (non) actions. Someone working with Holder emailed him with serious concerns around ligature risks. The assessor was concerned that either the risk scoring was inaccurate or signalled a general lack of understanding about how to complete ligature risk assessments. Both were deeply worrying. He concludes:

Finally there are action plans in each of the assessments which list all the points where actions are required; there appears to be no record of any actions being completed. This raises the question as to whether the actions have been completed at all, and the assessments not updated to reflect that, or whether the actions are still outstanding.

The same old, same old shite. Across four years now. Documented and shared with the senior management team. Who ignore it.

Given that Holder’s appointment came about because of an anonymous letter raising safety issues, you’d think his resignation and the various health and safety breaches he identified in a couple of months, would be taken seriously.  But no. It was business as usual. Six months later, in August 2012, a quality review, detailing shocking failings at the unit where LB died, was similarly ignored. [Howl]

Fast forward to April 2016, whipping past numerous failed CQC inspections, numerous deaths, inquests and Prevention of Future Deaths reports. Past the publication of the Mazars review… to which Sloven, four years after the above discussion about ligature risk, applied the same baseline stats (non) defence. The latest CQC inspection report will be published later this week. The Sloven senior team are, by all accounts, mounting their schmooze counter-attack. There isn’t a reflexive bone in their collective body that allows them to think, hang on a minute… We’ve really ballsed up here. Repeatedly. Patients have died. Repeatedly. And we clearly can’t do what is needed to improve the services we provide…

Nah. Nothing like it.

This CQC inspection was part of Jezza Hunt’s response to the Mazars review. It was the necessary first step before the CQC and NHS Improvement decide on any regulatory action. [I know]. Given the inspection identified failures generating warning notices a week or so ago. Given everything that has gone before. Given everything. There cannot be any more propping up of this toxic senior management shower. Surely.

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‘What the Verita?’ and broken narratives

Been at a Broken Narratives conference this week in Prato, Italy. Fascinating papers and people, good company, sunshine and piazzas. What a privilege. Now I’m thinking about Verita and the two ‘independent’ reviews they did about LB [howl]. For which they must have been paid a costa del fortune.

We were naffed off with the second review pretty much from the start really. And the finished version made no sense. Having read the transcripts from the staff interviews for the first review, shared with us before LB’s inquest, our confidence dropped to the level of ‘What the Verita?‘ Flimsy interviews, heavy on the interviewer blather and little or no probing.

Mmm. What the Verita indeedy?

verita

The second paragraph on their website blurb is a bit peculiar. It seems to be a veiled way of reassuring organisations [the NHS] that might want a bit of shonky, that they do a good enough job without doing a thorough, robust and warts and all investigation. Stating our approach is always measured, appropriate and focused on improvement pretty much says ‘we do superficial, skeletons remain buried and we’ll come up with a few suggestions’. And this is exactly what they did.

The first review, focusing on the immediacy of what happened to LB, failed to uncover that a patient died in the same bath as LB several years before. Despite two of the staff Verita interviewed being present on both occasions. [No words]. Despite the original terms of reference (a) including direct reference to the earlier patient and the slightly revised terms of reference (b) alluding to it:

(a) ‘to review how learning out of concerns from a previous similar incident has been embedded in practice and informed care practice and safety’

 

(b) ‘to review how learning out of concerns from any previous similar incidents/external reports has been embedded in practice and informed care practice and safety.’

Verita just ignored this in their first review. Their methods simply failed to uncover what was clearly a very well known about earlier incident. I suspect it’s hard to ‘forget’ being present when someone dies whatever the circumstances…

In an NHS hospital.
In a bath.
And a second person dies in the same bath

Nah. It really shouldn’t take a police investigation, an unfinished HSE investigation, two ‘independent’ reviews and almost an inquest to not unearth this.

Moving onto the baffling and serious pile of crap, second review (Verita2). We declined to comment on the draft we received last summer. George Julian who represented us on the expert review panel similarly withdrew from the process. She details her 10 reasons why here. I wouldn’t recommend wasting time reading the review. It is truly nonsensical.

Sloven’s legal team clamoured to get Verita2 admitted as evidence to LB’s inquest while spending £42,000 [of public money] in legal fees to try to sink publication of the Mazars review. [This underlines how non independent Verita really are]. It was eventually published, to silence at the end of October 2015.

Last week (was it really only last week?) we were leaked a Quality and Safety Review written by a Sloven employee in August 2012. This clearly documents numerous failures at STATT where LB died and the next door unit, John Sharich House a few months before Sloven took over the provision. In Verita 2, Finding 5 states:

The trust undertook appropriate, adequate and reasonable due diligence into the quality and safety of the services prior to acquisition. The due diligence reviews did not identify any acute concerns about the safety of services in STATT. The more acute concerns were focused on the non-Oxfordshire services.

Mmm. Awkward. Gut wrenchingly, howlingly, awkward.

I emailed a Verita partner to say, erm.. little bit of a cock up here, matey. Twice. He emailed back, very sharpish, to say they’d seen the review I mentioned [clearly they hadn’t or they couldn’t possibly produce Finding 5] and there was no mention of the earlier death in the staff interviews. He finished by saying Verita ‘obviously investigated in detail the processes and practices within the unit – these underpinned the conclusions reached in the report’.

Blimey.

I think, in this inhumanely long, tortuous and consistently distressing journey we’ve learned there is nothing obvious on the part of the actions of any of the state, or state appointed representatives, other than deny, deceive, batter and deflect. Verita did (can’t even call it conducted) two, very well paid, reviews. Neither hold up to scrutiny.

I thought my email would lead to them seizing the opportunity to defend their independent, robust and experienced reputation. And turn a lens on their practices; retract, respond, revise and openly talk about what they will do in future to make sure NHS Trusts disclose all the relevant documentation. But that was before I read their website blurb.

[Fill in your own words here. I have none. And feel free to swear your fucking socks off].

I listened to a diverse set of papers in the last few days. Thoughtful, engaged reflections about listening to the experiences of people who may not be able to articulate their experiences in ‘recognisable’ ways. People who are too often silenced by the actions of others (including researchers).

About trying to open up, challenge and change academic practices (it was an academic conference..) We heard narratives about dementia, cancer, trauma, brain injury, hearing voices, autism, sexuality, child sexual abuse

I’m now thinking that there are some truly broken narratives in spaces you wouldn’t think to look.

prato

Delusions and denial

I’m on leave this week. Time to try and regain some home life and ‘order’. Sigh. Today I was home alone. A rare happening. I set too, in between sitting around doing crap all, sorting through stuff. Sifting. Our ‘filing basket/pile’ had bills/statements dating backing to January 2013. The land that time forget.

LB’s chest in our bedroom distracted me. It does when I’m alone. I avoided it. I remember the last time I opened it. And cry-howled in a horrible, empty way. I can’t fucking look in it. At the stuff of love, life, simplicity, richness and depth. Trashed repeatedly by the (non) response of Sloven, Oxfordshire County Council and the wider gang of NHS England, CQC, Monitor (or NHS Improvement ‘my arse’) and Jeremy Hunt.

I finished reading the latest Sloven board papers.

This is always an exercise in incredulity, rage and despair. And time. Typically over 200 pages with gratuitous gibberish/nonsense.

Tucked away on p96 (41.4), in the CEO report, was this gem:

Sloven shite 2

Alleged ‘Trust failings’. Despite everything. The CEO continues to deny evidenced and clearly identified failings. Her arrogance is extraordinary and with it will come no ‘learning’ or improvement. Despite the Comms team developing positive news.

The day was punctuated with various and unexpected Sloven activity and developments. The Sloven problem ain’t going away despite their ‘hunker down, deny and ignore’ approach to the carnage they cause. When you’re as shite as they are, there will always be shite ahead. And there is. Something Jezza, Monitor, NHS England and the CQC don’t seem to grasp.

Alleged ‘Trust failings’? I hope the new Improvement Director has a foray through their board papers. To get an insight into an organisation led by a combination of spin, jargon, arrogance, delusion and stupidity. It really ain’t rocket science what the problem is here.

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One way wriggle to the moon

The big shocker (and there were were several) during LB’s inquest was the revelation on Day 4 that a patient died in the same bath as LB in 2006. The Responsible Clinician let it be known, through her counsel, that she had been actively discouraged by members of Sloven senior management from raising the issue of this earlier death. In the same bath…

Ground spinning stuff. Sloven revealing new depths of odious deceitfulness and an astonishingly relentless determination to not be open, honest or transparent.

It transpired that two staff members were on site and involved in the response to LB and the earlier patient’s death. And (at least) two other staff members worked at the unit in 2006. I wrote about this a while back.

[Howl].

How this patient’s death was not mentioned to the police, the coroner, the HSE, Verita, to us, until this reveal on October 9 2015, is just, I dunno. I’m running out of words.

He died of natural causes apparently. Though this was simply guesswork. There was no postmortem or inquest despite him being only 57 and fully expected to come out of the bathroom alive that day…

At points like this I almost expect (hope) my keyboard will spontaneously combust. The utter wrongness of what I jab out on the keys, over and over again… Wrongness and repeated wrongness. With no glimpse of right or just ever happening.

Today we got a letter from the coroner. I’ve been a bit of a champion of the coroner but my champ tokens are running out now. He said at the end of LB’s inquest he would ask Sloven to explain why the first death wasn’t disclosed earlier. I chased him up about this a few weeks ago. [Note: You have to chase up everything. No one in authority volunteers anything.]

He replied:

I received an apology from the trust in December and an explanation that there was no active decision to withhold the information and that it was simply the case that the matters known to the trust did not suggest that there was a real link to LB’s death and therefore it did not occur to the trust to inform me. As I say, this is the explanation received from the trust. It should have been raised earlier.

Wow. Simply just wow.

‘Simply the case’… ‘No active decision’? Matters did not suggest there was a real link? The same bath. A seizure. The same staff present? No real link? Oh, and active discouragement from raising it…

Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust are arrogant/deluded/I don’t know what enough to defend the indefensible even after the Mazars review findings are public. How could this person’s death not be relevant? And who are they to decide whether it is or not?

What sort of monstrousness are we dealing with here?

The coroner finishes with the statement:

I am afraid that I am unable to assist or comment any further due to the fact that I no longer have any legal jurisdiction once a case is concluded.

So Sloven should have raised it but they didn’t. Hey ho. Nothing like a bit of one way wriggle room to the moon. Cards stacked clearly in favour of the system. Against people/families. A simple siloing which enables every official to pass the buck. My bit is fine. I’m ticking the boxes involved in my role. And I don’t have to look at the bigger picture.

Until the various players/actors involved in or associated with this almighty mess are prepared to step up and act, we may as well chuck in the towel.

Here’s a thought. Why not give stepping up a go?

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The unmaking of a scandal and the dove from above

On December 10 2015, the scandalous findings of the Mazars review (into Sloven’s investigation practices when learning disability and mental health service user patients died unexpectedly) were leaked to the BBC. The headlines were horrific. 

Heidi Alexander tabled an urgent question in the House of Commons that morning and serious discussion followed. Deeply serious we thought at the time. A stack of MPs asked important and relevant questions.The full text of the session can be read here. Or you can watch it here.

The Mazars review was ‘profoundly shocking’. The stuff of scandal.

Heidi A nailed the central issue with this statement, love her:

The report raises broader questions about the care of people with learning disabilities or mental health problems. Just because some individuals have less ability to communicate concerns about their care, that must never mean that any less attention is paid to their treatment or their death. That would be the ultimate abrogation of responsibility, and one which should shame us all. The priority now must be to understand how this was allowed to happen, and to ensure this is put right so it can never happen again.

Unmaking the scandal

But the scandal was unmade. Over the course of a few weeks. Urgency dissipated and nothing happened. The Sloven CEO and Board remained untouched despite the report clearly laying the failings at their feet (and despite public appearances that still make my toes wince with awkwardness for just how crap they clearly are).

Why the scandal was unmade is a tricky one. How is a bit easier to unravel. First, there was the cracking timing of the eventual publication of the report. Just as MPs finished for the Christmas break. Literally. This built in a two week or so hiatus allowing some of the intensity of feeling around the findings to ease. This timing was, ostensibly the decision of NHS England. Though given the news this morning that Simon Stevens, NHS England CEO, was leant on by the government over NHS funding, it was quite possibly an order from above. The dove from above.

The dove from above may also explain the utterly unimpressive and ineffective  responses from NHS England, Monitor and the CQC. Giving a goldfish a knife and fork and expecting it to eat, type approaches. Worse than hopeless. Just pointless.

Having met Jeremy Hunt this year and listening to what he said carefully (a courtesy he didn’t extend to us), I re-read the Commons discussion from December this morning and realised how much he didn’t say. I think at the time we were so bowled over he’d sprung into action we didn’t pay proper attention to what he did say.

JezJezza laid out three steps ‘that will help create change in the culture we need’.

  1. Independently assured, Ofsted type style ratings of the quality of care offered to learning disabled people will be published for each of the 209 clinical commissioning group areas.
  2. NHS England have commissioned Bristol university to do an independent study into mortality rates of learning disabled people.
  3. Bruce Keogh will develop a methodology to publishing the number of avoidable deaths per trust. Central to that will be establishing a no-blame reporting culture across the NHS, with people being rewarded, not penalised, for speaking openly and transparently about mistakes.

Not sure where 1. came from but 2. and 3. were already underway before the Mazars findings were circulated. So not a big response by the Secretary of State. The Bristol review stuff is a bit of a waste of time because it’s underfunded and stripped back to the bare bones of research (though I’ve no doubt the team are doing the best job they can within these confines).

In the thirty minute question and answer session that followed this opening statement Jezza repeated human factor speak over and over again. Pretty much ignoring the implications of the review. He only mentioned learning disabled people once. Many of his responses (see below) to various MPs were irrelevant to the Mazars findings given there was no blame culture. No investigations. Nobody cared. People were expected to die early and when they did it was natural causes. No questions asked.

We have to move away from a blame culture in the NHS to a culture in which doctors and nurses are supported if they speak out, which too often is not the case. (to Heidi Alexander)

The hon. Lady has been a practising clinician, so I am sure she will understand that at the heart of this issue is the need to get the culture right. (to Dr Philippa Whitford)

There is an interesting comparison with the airline industry: when it investigate accidents, the vast majority of times, those investigations point to systemic failure. When the NHS investigates clinical accidents, the vast majority of times we point to individual failure. (to Jeremy Lefroy)

I do not see the treatment of people with learning difficulties as distinct from the broader lessons in the Francis report, but if we fail to make progress, I know that the right hon. Gentleman will come back to me, and rightly so. (to Norman Lamb)

I also think, however, that there is a systemic issue in relation to the low reporting of avoidable and preventable deaths and harm, and the failure to develop a true learning culture in the NHS, which in the end is what doctors, nurses and patients all want and need. (to Caroline Nokes)

..if we are going to improve the reporting culture, which in the end is what the report is about, we have to change the fear that many doctors and nurses have that if they are open and transparent about mistakes they have made or seen, they will get dumped on. That is a real worry for many people. Part of this is about creating a supportive culture, so that when people take the brave decision to be open about something that has gone wrong they get the support that they deserve. (to Cheryl Gillan)

When there is a problem, we need a culture where the NHS is totally open and as keen as the families are themselves to understand what happened, whether it could be avoided, and what lessons can be learned. (to Diana Johnson)

We have to recognise that everyone is human, but, uniquely, doctors are in a profession where when they make mistakes, as we all do in our own worlds, people sometimes die. The result of that should not automatically be to say that the doctor was clinically negligent. Ninety-nine times out of 100, we should deduce from the mistake what can be learned to avoid it happening in future. Of course, where there is gross negligence, due process should take its course, but that is only on a minority of occasions. (to Bob Blackman)

He is right about making sure that we get the culture right. It is about creating a more supportive environment for people who do a very, very tough job every day of the week. (to Barry Sheerman)

We need a culture where, when people raise concerns, they are confident they will be listened to. (to Jim Cunningham)

Jezza’s performance was simply a warm up to his recent patient safety global summit gig. Astonishing really. And how he could host a global patient safety summit, bigging up NHS efforts in this arena while ignoring the thorny issue of a group of people consistently dying prematurely in NHS care, without question, without blame and without learning is extraordinary.

But patients aren’t equal of course. Even in the NHS. There’s consistent evidence for this. And some people aren’t really patients.

When we met Jezza he steadfastly refused to engage with or acknowledge that, given the Mazars review revealed that less than 1%* of the deaths of learning disabled people were investigated, urgent scrutiny was needed to look at what was happening and how this was allowed to happen. He repeated human factor stuff. Stepford wife styley.

[*The two deaths that were investigated were LB and, from local intelligence, another patient in the same unit who died a week or so after him so the figure could easily have been 0. 0. 0. 0. 0… 0… ]

Such wilful stubbornness (with sprinklings of stupidity and arrogance) has (ironically) probably consigned a very rare window for proper scrutiny and focus to be turned onto a group of people who die early back to blackout. 

Why? Why has this been allowed to happen? The most scandalous report in the history of learning disability history kicked into the long grass? I dunno. Here’s a few suggestions. A bit of an overlapping jumble as it’s difficult to tease this stuff out.

  1. The extent of eugenic practices that occur under the ‘watchful eye’ of NHS/social care is too big to go near.
  2. Uncovering such practices is feared a) morally (way too uncomfortable and messy to go near); b) economically (potential litigation costs relating to the uncovering of further scandalous practices together with the cost of budgets associated with longer living people are too high).
  3. Premature deaths are ok really or even welcomed because a) certain people ain’t fully human b) are costly, burdensome and unproductive c) the old ‘better off dead’/lives unworthy of life type arguments.
  4. People in positions who can do something about this, and there are some bloody brilliant people who are doing their best, are obstructed from doing their jobs.
  5. Jeremy Hunt sees the HF thing as a calling and has got a bit of a chunky god complex going on. The Mazars review is a pesky complication best ignored.

The dove from above factor.

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